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that he was a bad judge? Or don't the people of California know 
which values they share? 
In sum, Grodin's odyssey is a fascinating one, but he does not 
convince this reader that the voters were wrong. 
"RACIAL MAITERS": THE FBI'S SECRET FILE ON 
BLACK AMERICA, 1968-1972. By Kenneth O'Reilly.1 
New York: Free Press, 1989. Pp. vii, 456. Cloth, $24.95. 
Michael R. Belknap 2 
The 1988 movie "Mississippi Burning" depicted the FBI as a 
protector of blacks. Led by Gene Hackman, its agents streamed 
into Mississippi to do battle with bigots and the Klan. Although 
"Mississippi Burning" simply reiterated in a somewhat more fic-
tionalized form the heroic portrayal of the FBI's role in the fight for 
racial justice already presented by Don Whitehead in his 1970 book 
Attack on Terror3 and by the 1975 made-for-television movie of the 
same title, it became the target of vocal critics, such as Coretta Scott 
King, who complained that, among other things, the film grossly 
overstated both the FBI's commitment to the cause of civil rights 
and its contributions to the success of the civil rights movement. 4 
Professor Kenneth O'Reilly's compelling account, Racial Matters, 
proves beyond question that the critics were correct. O'Reilly dem-
onstrates that, far from protecting the civil rights movement, for 
about a decade in the 1960s and early 1970s the FBI waged war on 
black America. He leaves in doubt only the motivation behind the 
Bureau's attack. 
Racial Matters is the sort of first-rate monograph O'Reilly's 
earlier writing on the subject would lead one to expects It is, to be 
I. Professor of History, University of Alaska, Anchorage. 
2. Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, and Visiting Professor of His-
tory, University of California, San Diego. 
3. D. WHITEHEAD, ATIACK ON TERROR (1970). 
4. See, Champlin, 'Burning' Issue: How Much to Alter Fact to Fuel Drama, L.A. 
Times, Jan. 24, 1989, VI, at I, cols. 4-5. 
5. In recent years O'Reilly has focused his critical gaze on the FBI's relations with 
black America, producing several important articles and papers on that topic. See, e.g., 
O'Reilly, The Roosevelt Administration and Black America: Federal Surveillance Policy and 
Civil Rights During the New Deal and World War II Years, 48 PHYLON 12 (1987); The FBI 
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the Politics of Riots, 1964-1968, 75 J. AM. HIST. 91 (1988)( (hereinafter cited as O'Reilly, 
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sure, not a perfect book. O'Reilly mischaracterizes 18 U.S.C. § 242 
as a conspiracy statute (p. 201) and erroneously reports that all 
three of the Ku Klux Klansmen responsible for the 1965 murder of 
white civil rights worker Viola Liuzzo were tried and acquitted in 
an Alabama state court (p. 221 ). 6 In addition, his Chapter 6 ("Klan 
Wars") is not as well organized as it might be. 
On the whole, though, this is a very well written book. The 
prose is lively and hard-hitting, and O'Reilly makes his argument 
clearly and effectively. He also supports it with a wealth of evi-
dence. Like his earlier books and articles, Racial Matters relies 
heavily on FBI documents, most of them obtained through use of 
the Freedom of Information Act. O'Reilly also employs records of 
the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, Mili-
tary Intelligence, and the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, he 
has consulted approximately seventy manuscript collections in pres-
idential libraries and other archival repositories around the country 
and conducted more than seventy interviews. 1 His command of the 
secondary literature on both civil rights and the FBI is as impres-
sive as his primary research. 
O'Reilly eStablishes that the FBI did not do much to protect 
participants in the civil rights movement. The charges he levels are 
hardly new. Civil rights activists censured the Bureau repeatedly 
during the early 1960s. A Justice Department lawyer who attended 
the hearings which the Commission of Inquiry into the Administra-
tion of Justice in the Freedom Struggle held in Washington on May 
25-26, 1962 reported: 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation was roundly criticized by many of the wit-
nesses .... The general tenor of these criticisms was that the Special Agents were 
not interested at all in civil rights cases, were perfunctory in their investigations, did 
not pursue all available leads, and in several cases were outspokenly critical of those 
engaged in direct action in the Freedom Struggle. 8 
Reach: O'Reilly and Theoharis on FBI Intelligence Operations, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
201, 204 n.19. 
6. Actually, only one of the three accused klansmen, Collie Leroy Wilkins, was tried 
and found not guilty in the first of two Alabama state trials. M. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAw 
AND SOUTHERN ORDER 188-89 (1987). O'Reilly correctly reports that Wilkins was the only 
defendant in a second state trial (p. 189), and that all three klansmen were subsequently 
convicted on federal civil rights conspiracy charges (p. 193-94). 
7. A majority of these interviews seem to have been conducted by telephone. While 
that method is not ideal, unless he is extremely wealthy, an historian based in Anchorage, 
Alaska has little choice but to rely heavily upon it. 
8. Memorandum from Theodore R. Newman, Jr. to Burke Marshall (May 28, 1962), 
Box 31, Burke Marshall Papers, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachu-
setts. The Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Justice in the Freedom Strug-
gle, set up by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), was chaired by former First Lady 
Eleanor Roosevelt and Socialist party leader Norman Thomas. See M. BELKNAP, supra note 
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Historians have echoed contemporary critics of J. Edgar Hoover's 
FBI, picturing it as an organization uninterested in civil rights and 
unwilling to exert itself to provide protection for those working to 
promote the cause of racial justice. 9 
While not the first scholar to fault the Bureau for failing to 
protect civil rights activists against white violence, O'Reilly offers 
far more evidence to substantiate the criticism than have his prede-
cessors. He shows that Director Hoover regarded civil rights work-
ers as troublemakers. FBI agents stood by while angry racists beat 
them, declining to make arrests or even to restrain the attackers. 
Indeed, the Bureau sometimes passed information about upcoming 
demonstrations to southern police departments that it knew had 
been infiltrated by the Klan, thus, however unintentionally, assist-
ing Klansmen in attacking protesters. More worried about the state 
of its relations with southern lawmen than about the safety of black 
activists, the FBI showed little enthusiasm for enforcing the federal 
civil rights statutes that might have been used to punish this racist 
violence. Hoover insisted his agency could do little about the situa-
tion, because maintaining law and order was the job of state and 
local police, and if the Bureau usurped their responsibility it would 
be violating the Constitution. 
In arguing that federalism precluded the FBI from protecting 
the targets of racist violence, O'Reilly notes, Hoover was echoing 
sentiments articulated by such Justice Department leaders as Rob-
ert F. Kennedy, who served as attorney general in his brother 
John's administration, and Burke Marshall, the assistant attorney 
general who ran the Kennedys' Civil Rights Division. That obser-
vation is not novel. 10 O'Reilly provides an important new insight, 
however, when he points out that the legal and constitutional 
scruples which kept Hoover and his superiors from providing the 
civil rights movement with federal protection did not keep them 
from subjecting it to federal surveillance. Viewing black activists as 
potential subversives and civil rights demonstrations as threats to 
law and order, the FBI determined to keep an eye on both. Hoover 
did not see any constitutional problem in monitoring the move-
ment. Nor did officials in the Departments of Justice. The Ken-
nedy administration viewed surveillance as more convenient and 
9. See, e.g., M. BELKNAP, supra note 6, at 112-14; R. POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER 
368 (1987); A. ScHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TiMFS 291-93, 352-65 
(1978); A. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA 80 (1984). Somewhat less critical is 
C. BRAUER, JoHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 161-65, 289 (1977). 
10. This reviewer made the same point several years ago. See Belknap, The Vindication 
of Burke Marshall: The Southern Legal System and the Anti-Civil Rights Violence of the 
1960s, 33 EMORY L.J. 93, 94-98 (1984). 
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less controversial than aggressive enforcement of civil rights laws or 
the protection of civil rights workers. "Neither Robert Kennedy 
nor the attorneys in the Civil Rights Division were struck by the 
contradiction between the FBI's strict-constructionist posture on 
civil rights enforcement and its anything-goes activities in surveil-
lance," O'Reilly asserts. 
He offers not only a more penetrating analysis of Hoover's con-
stitutional position than that presented by other writers, but also a 
harsher condemnation of the Bureau's record in the race relations 
area. According to O'Reilly, the FBI was guilty not merely of fail-
ing to protect civil rights activists from attacks by others but of 
itself assailing their movement. The Bureau went on the offensive 
in 1963. Before that, although Hoover was unsympathetic to the 
cause of integration and had assigned agents to investigate civil 
rights organizations from 1919 on in search of Communist or other 
subversive influences, he had avoided openly aligning his agency 
with the opponents of black equality. Through the 1940s and 1950s 
the Director sought to protect himself and the Bureau by not al-
lowing his organization to become publicly identified with either 
side of what he recognized as a fundamental and divisive debate. 
When asked to enforce civil rights laws, such as the voting legisla-
tion Congress enacted in 1957 and 1960, Hoover's FBI dragged its 
feet and did as little as possible. The Director's obstructionism did 
not rise to the level of active opposition, however. As O'Reilly re-
ports, "His real hope was that the civil rights movement would dis-
appear on its own, that he personally would not have to expose 
himself to the risk of openly opposing it." 
The August 1963 March on Washington, led by Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., destroyed that hope. This huge demonstration, in 
which more than 200,000 Americans participated, demonstrated 
that the drive for racial equality was advancing with broad-based 
support. According to O'Reilly, "The March on Washington con-
vinced Hoover that the civil rights movement would not wither 
away on its own, that he would have to smash it before it irrepara-
bly damaged his America." "Before the summer of 1963 ended," 
O'Reilly says, "the FBI began to transform what had been a hold-
ing action against black demands for justice and equality into a 
frontal assault on Dr. King and the movement he helped to lead." 
The Bureau sought to head off what its leaders viewed as an 
impending social revolution by discrediting the civil rights crusade, 
seeking to portray it as tainted with communism. The principal tar-
get of this effort was Dr. King, one of whose advisors had formerly 
been active in the Communist party. The Bureau later tried to dis-
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credit King in other ways, and disseminated derogatory information 
on other civil rights activists as well. Amidst the rioting that 
erupted in many of the country's urban ghettos during the period 
1964 -1968, the FBI escalated its war on black America, adding to 
an already pervasive surveillance operation a Ghetto Informant 
Program. It also initiated an aggressive counterintelligence pro-
gram (COINTELPRO), designed to disrupt so-called "Black Hate 
Groups" by provoking conflict within and between such organiza-
tions. Late in the administration of President Lyndon Johnson, the 
Bureau launched an all-out attack on the tough-talking Black Pan-
ther Party that left several Panthers dead. As O'Reilly notes, "[o]f 
the thousands of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence in-
vestigations launched against black activists, only the Martin Lu-
ther King case rivaled the Panther case in its ferocity. . . . " He 
adds, in a kind of ironic summary of the Bureau's relationship with 
African-Americans during the period 1960-1972, "[t]he 1960s had 
begun with FBI agents standing by while southern lawmen beat 
black activists, and ended with FBI agents inciting police violence 
against black activists in the urban North." 
Other scholars have discussed various facets of this attack on 
black activism. In his biography of Hoover, Richard Powers deals 
briefly with the Bureau's assault on the Panthers, 11 and David Gar-
row has written an entire book on its campaign to destroy Martin 
Luther King.12 No scholar, however, has authored such a compre-
hensive account of the FBI's attack on civil rights activists and 
black militants nor developed such a coherent picture of what 
O'Reilly argues persuasively was in fact a war against the entire 
Afro-American community. 
While castigating the Bureau for attacking black America, 
O'Reilly denigrates its vaunted skirmish with the Ku Klux Klan. 
"From beginning to end," he writes, "the Klan wars remained a 
sideshow to the real war against the black struggle for racial jus-
tice." Hoover disliked the Klan because it gave white supremacy a 
bad name, but he would not have undertaken the campaign glorified 
by Don Whitehead and "Mississippi Burning" if he had not been 
forced to do so. "Of all the FBI's counterintelligence programs ... 
only the Klan effort resulted from outside pressure," O'Reilly ex-
plains. According to him, that "pressure came from the press and 
the White House, from Robert Kennedy and then from [his succes-
sor as attorney general] Nicholas Katzenbach, and from the civil 
rights movement itself." 
II. R. PowERS, supra note 9, at 458-60. 
12. D. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1981). 
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O'Reilly stresses that the FBI preferred intelligence investiga-
tions and counterintelligence actions to gathering evidence for use 
in criminal prosecutions of Klansmen. By relying on spying and 
dirty tricks and staying out of court, he says, the FBI could avoid 
disrupting its good relations with southern police departments and 
could also "act without lawyers." Political scientist William W. 
Keller provides support for this argument. Keller agrees with 
O'Reilly that Hoover preferred the disruption and dirty tricks asso-
ciated with the White Hate Groups COINTELPRO, launched by 
the Bureau in September, 1964, to criminal prosecution of the Klan, 
and that he did not reveal much of what this program involved to 
Attorney General Katzenbach.t3 
Nevertheless, O'Reilly's argument is not entirely persuasive. 
The sheer magnitude of the FBI's anti-Klan campaign suggests this 
was more than just a sideshow. By late 1965 the Bureau had more 
than 2,000 informants operating inside the KKK. Twenty percent 
of all Klan members, and even the grand dragon of one southern 
state, were working for the FBI. When civil rights workers Michael 
Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman disappeared 
near Philadelphia, Mississippi in June of 1964, the FBI dispatched 
150 agents to search for them.t4 That same summer it sent fifty-
three men to Athens, Georgia to investigate the murder by 
Klansmen of black Army Reserve Officer Lemuel Penn.ts O'Reilly 
is right that the Bureau had to be pressured into making this mas-
sive commitment, but so did the White House and the Justice De-
partment.t6 As he himself points out, there was a very practical 
reason for federal authorities to rely on a COINTELPRO rather 
than criminal prosecution to smash the KKK: southern juries sel-
dom convicted white men for crimes of violence against blacks. 
Furthermore, when Justice Department lawyers managed to break 
this pattern and obtain guilty verdicts against the klansmen respon-
sible for the deaths of Penn, Schwerner, Goodman, Chaney and 
Liuzzo, it did so with evidence gathered by the FBI, much of it 
acquired only because of the Bureau's extensive infiltration of the 
Klan.t7 In its combat with the KKK, the FBI was not the white 
knight depicted by its apologists. But as Richard Gid Powers ob-
serves, "Hoover directed massive investigations of racial violence in 
the South and he forestalled more violence by disrupting and even-
13. W. KELLER, THE LIBERALS AND J. EDGAR HOOVER 90-92 (1989). 
14. M. BELKNAP, supra note 6, at 156. 
15. Id. at 152. 
16. /d. at 143-58. 
17. /d. at 128-204. 
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tually destroying the South's network of murderous K.lans."ts In 
his eagerness to focus attention on the Bureau's sometimes vicious 
assault on black activists, O'Reilly gives the FBI a bit less credit for 
its "Klan Wars" than the Bureau probably deserves. 
This problem is at most one of emphasis, however, and it does 
not seriously detract from an otherwise outstanding work. The 
only really disturbing feature of Racial Matters is O'Reilly's failure 
to provide a persuasive explanation for the FBI's conduct. The 
closest this book comes to illuminating the cause of the phenome-
non it describes so brilliantly is a passage in which O'Reilly asserts 
that Hoover viewed "the black struggle ... as a threat to his way of 
life, his bureaucracy, and his vision of a white Christian, and har-
monious America." In several other places as well, O'Reilly attrib-
utes the Bureau's campaign against Afro-American activists to the 
Director's determination to preserve his own way of life. Racial 
Matters never describes that way of life, however, nor explains why 
Hoover believed that racial equality would destroy it. In his biogra-
phy of the Director, Powers devotes two chapters to developing a 
picture of the value system that his subject acquired during a boy-
hood spent on Seward Square in the Capitol Hill section of Wash-
ington, D.C., then uses that value system to explain much of what 
Hoover did during his long career with the FBI.t9 O'Reilly fails to 
provide his readers with a comparable description of what it was 
Hoover thought he was defending. For that reason, his terse 
explanations for the Director's war on black America remain 
unconvincing. 
They fail to persuade not only because of their brevity but also 
because much of his own evidence, as well as much that has been 
written by others, suggests a different explanation for Hoover's con-
duct. There is general agreement that Hoover was a manipulative 
bureaucrat, determined to advance his own and his Bureau's inter-
ests. Furthermore, he was capable of subordinating his personal 
predilections to bureaucratic considerations. For example, in 1953-
1954, despite his intense hostility toward communists, Hoover ter-
minated his once close relationship with Joe McCarthy, in order to 
protect his agency's image.2o 
A commitment to promoting the interests of the FBI also ex-
plains the Director's approach to racial matters. O'Reilly is no 
doubt correct in picturing Hoover as a racist who shared the con-
victions of diehard southern segregationists and had no use for the 
18. R. PoWERS, supra note 9, at 407. 
19. SeeR. PowERS, supra note 9, at 5-35 and passim. 
20. A. THEOHARIS & ]. COX, THE Boss 292-99 (1988). 
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idea of black advancement. But his racial views do not appear to be 
what determined FBI policies and priorities. As O'Reilly acknowl-
edges, during the 1950s, "despite Hoover's personal hostility to-
ward the integration movement, he would not commit the Bureau 
to the other side." In the early 1960s, the FBI subjected movement 
activists to surveillance but refused to provide them with protection. 
Elsewhere, O'Reilly explains why: "The Kennedys exerted little 
pressure on the FBI to protect civil rights workers, while they con-
stantly pressured the FBI to do more of the thing that J. Edgar 
Hoover wanted to do all along-spy on civil rights workers. "2t In 
1964 the Bureau went to war with the Ku Klux Klan, attacking 
terrorists and thereby providing security for the same movement it 
had so long opposed. As Powers explains, the reason was that 
"Lyndon Johnson had finally managed to persuade J. Edgar Hoover 
to order the FBI to enforce civil rights laws in the South in an ag-
gressive and effective fashion. "22 When ghetto rioting made black 
militants the focus of public and presidential concern, Hoover went 
after them. His motivation, like that which had controlled his ap-
proach to racial matters for decades, was bureaucratic. As O'Reilly 
has written in an excellent article on the subject, "The president 
used the FBI director to cope with the political problems unleashed 
by the riots, and the director used the president to broaden his 
agency's domestic intelligence mandate."23 
In other words, Hoover repeatedly gave his superiors what 
they wanted because that served the FBI's interests. Bureau policy 
altered in response to changes in presidential and Justice Depart-
ment policy. But Justice and the White House were in turn re-
sponding to public opinion, as their dramatic turnaround on the 
protection issue following the disappearance of Schwerner, Good-
man, and Chaney demonstrates.24 If the FBI waged war on black 
America, then it must have done so because most of the time that is 
what most Americans wanted it to do. This interpretation is more 
consistent with the evidence than an explanation that focuses on 
Hoover's determination to protect his own vaguely-defined way of 
life. What Racial Matters suggests is a profoundly disturbing 
thought: the FBI's racism is our own. 
21. O'Reilly, Kennedy Years, supra note 5, at 205. 
22. R. PowERS, supra note 9, at 408. 
23. O'Reilly, Riots, supra note 5, at 92. 
24. SeeM. Belknap, supra note 6, at 128-58. 
